When Does the Internet Create Territorial Jurisdiction? Re-thinking the Geography of IP Litigation in India

When does an online act legally happen in a particular place?

A trademark may be advertised from Mumbai, viewed by a consumer in Delhi, purchased in Bengaluru and fulfilled from a warehouse in another State. A digital advertisement may reach millions without being directed at any particular jurisdiction. The internet has therefore unsettled a principle that territorial jurisdiction traditionally took for granted: that commercial activity has a geographical centre.

The Delhi High Court’s reference to a Larger Bench in Hindustan Unilever Ltd. v. Kwick Living (I) Pvt. Ltd., 2026 SCC OnLine Del 6451, brings that problem into sharp focus. On 25 August 2026, Justice A.J. Bhambhani referred three questions concerning territorial jurisdiction in intellectual property disputes, identifying an apparent tension between Section 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (“CPC”), Section 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 and Section 62(2) of the Copyright Act, 1957. The reference is significant because it asks whether traditional jurisdictional principles can accommodate digital commerce without making such jurisdiction virtually limitless.

From physical presence to digital presence

The starting point is Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia, (2015) 10 SCC 161. The Supreme Court recognised that Sections 62(2) of the Copyright Act and 134(2) of the Trade Marks Act provide an additional forum to IP owners, but cautioned against allowing those provisions to become instruments of forum shopping.

The Delhi High Court subsequently articulated the principle in Ultra Home Construction Pvt. Ltd. v. Purushottam Kumar Chaubey, 2016 SCC OnLine Del 376, distinguishing the plaintiff’s principal office, subordinate office and the place where the cause of action arose. The concern was that special IP jurisdiction was intended to facilitate enforcement, not permit a plaintiff with offices across India to select a distant forum having little connection with the dispute.

So far it was about physical geography. The internet disrupts that model: a website without branch office, a digital advertisement without storefront, and customer transacting with a business without a physical presence in the same State.

The question consequently becomes: what constitutes a sufficient territorial connection when the commercial activity itself is digital?

Accessibility is not the same as targeting

The Delhi High Court confronted this issue in Banyan Tree Holding (P) Ltd. v. A. Murali Krishna Reddy, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 3780. The Court rejected the proposition that mere accessibility of a website in Delhi automatically conferred jurisdiction. A website may be accessible everywhere; that does not mean its owner has subjected itself to the jurisdiction of every court.

The law did not stop there. In World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Reshma Collection, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 2031, the Division Bench considered the meaning of “carrying on business” in the context of e-commerce. Later jurisprudence has understood WWE as diluting, to some extent, the insistence in Banyan Tree upon an actual completed transaction. Where an interactive website permits commercial transactions within the forum, the existence of that transactional marketplace may itself become relevant to jurisdiction.

The distinction is subtle but important. Banyan Tree asks whether the defendant has sufficiently engaged with the forum; WWE recognises that, in an e-commerce environment, the marketplace itself may exist digitally rather than physically. The difficulty is determining how far this principle can extend without collapsing territorial jurisdiction into universal jurisdiction.

Kohinoor Seed Fields: the conflict becomes sharper

The tension became particularly visible in Kohinoor Seed Fields India Pvt. Ltd. v. Veda Seed Sciences Pvt. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine Del 8727.

The dispute concerned allegedly infringing products appearing on e-commerce platforms. The Single Judge rejected the contention that mere online availability was enough to establish territorial jurisdiction. The Division Bench subsequently took a broader view, holding that pleaded availability of the allegedly infringing products for sale through e-commerce platforms could constitute part of the cause of action.

The jurisprudential evolution is revealing:

accessibility → interactivity → potential commercial transaction → commercial engagement with the forum. The difficulty is that these concepts do not necessarily point to the same jurisdictional result.

An online listing may be visible in Delhi but controlled from Mumbai. A website may accept orders from Delhi without any actual sale having taken place in Delhi. A geo-targeted advertisement may deliberately address Delhi consumers without resulting in a transaction. The law therefore needs to distinguish digital visibility from meaningful territorial connection.

The HUL reference

That is precisely the problem presented by Hindustan Unilever.

HUL challenged an advertising campaign, “War on What’s Hidden”, which appeared through billboards, social media and the defendant’s website and allegedly disparaged HUL products including VIM and SURF EXCEL.

The defendant challenged Delhi’s territorial jurisdiction. The Single Judge noted the competing strands of authority and cautioned that accessibility of goods through the internet cannot dilute territorial jurisdiction to the point where a corporation could sue “in just about any location” in India. The Court consequently referred three questions to a Larger Bench: the interaction between Section 20 CPC and Sections 134(2)/62(2); whether a corporate plaintiff must sue at its principal office where

part of the cause of action also arises there; and, most significantly, what jurisdictional rule should govern online transactions in IP disputes in light of Banyan Tree, World Wrestling Entertainment and Kohinoor Seed Fields.

The reference is therefore less about deciding whether the internet is “territorial” and more about identifying what kind of digital conduct creates a territorial nexus.

Beyond accessibility: a meaningful territorial connection

There is a strong policy argument against treating accessibility alone as sufficient. If an advertisement uploaded in Mumbai can be accessed in Delhi, Bengaluru, Chennai and Kolkata, does that give the advertiser four potential forums? If an e-commerce platform permits delivery throughout India, does every High Court acquire jurisdiction? Such a rule would make territorial jurisdiction follow the architecture of the internet rather than the conduct of the defendant.

But the opposite extreme would also be artificial.

Consider a company that deliberately geo-targets Delhi consumers, runs Delhi-specific seasonal advertising, accepts orders from Delhi, offers Delhi delivery and derives substantial revenue therefrom. To deny Delhi jurisdiction merely because its registered office is in Mumbai would disregard the commercial reality of the transaction.

The answer may therefore lie in treating digital engagement as a spectrum rather than a binary test: mere accessibility → interactivity → purposeful targeting → commercial transaction → identifiable commercial impact. The further the conduct moves along that spectrum, the stronger the territorial nexus.

Jurisdiction may increasingly become an evidence question

The practical consequence is significant. A plaintiff may no longer be able to rely merely on the assertion that “the defendant’s website is accessible in Delhi”. Depending on the nature of the claim, it may need to demonstrate that Delhi consumers were targeted, orders could be placed from Delhi, goods were delivered there, advertising was directed there, or the impugned conduct caused identifiable commercial harm within the forum. Territorial jurisdiction may consequently become an important front-end litigation issue, rather than a procedural objection addressed only after the substantive dispute has progressed.

An important post-reference development

There is also a significant development in the HUL litigation itself. On 2 September 2026, the Division Bench hearing HUL’s appeal found that the immediate jurisdictional question could be resolved on the facts before it. Kwick Living confirmed that it had a GST registration in Delhi, with its principal place of business in Delhi, and that the impugned advertising hoardings had been erected in Delhi. It also confirmed that it sold its products in Delhi. The Division Bench therefore found that Sections 20(a) and 20(c) CPC were satisfied and disposed of the appeal, leaving the interim application to be considered on merits.

Importantly, however, the Division Bench did not express an opinion on the Larger Bench reference. The immediate dispute may therefore have found a factual answer, but the larger legal question remains alive.

Conclusion: geography is changing, but jurisdiction cannot disappear

The importance of Hindustan Unilever lies in the opportunity it presents to reconcile three competing realities. First, the special jurisdictional provisions under the Trade Marks Act and Copyright Act must continue to facilitate enforcement by IP owners. Second, the safeguards against forum shopping articulated in Sanjay Dalia cannot disappear merely because

commerce has moved online. Third, territorial jurisdiction must remain capable of recognising genuine commercial activity conducted through digital means. The central question should therefore not simply be: Can the website be accessed in Delhi? Nor should it necessarily be: Was a sale completed in Delhi? The more useful question may be: Did the defendant’s conduct have a sufficient connection with the forum to justify its jurisdiction? That approach recognises both realities: the borderless nature of the internet and the continuing territorial nature of judicial power.

The internet may have made commerce borderless. It should not, however, make jurisdiction limitless.

The article is authored by   Ms. Arpita Mukherjee (Senior Partner),  Ms.Prakarti Srivastava (Associate)